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Fixing Rule 1.6: The Montreal
Formulation Makes It Work
BY MELISSA BARTLETr*
INTRODUCTION
mongthe many concerns which surround the revision of Model
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rule
1.6"), one of the most debated is how to limit disclosure of
information under Rule 1.6(b)(1).' The debate revolves around which
modifier should be used m permitting or mandating disclosure of
confidential information to prevent "death or substantial bodily harm."2
The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission ("Commission"), appointed to draft
revisions to the Model Rules,3 has considered four possible limitation
devices. One retains the rule's current use of"immment" as the modifier
J.D. 1999, Umversity of Kentucky.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's
Observations (A)(2) (Proposed Rule Draft No. 5, 1998).
21d. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1998).
3SeeABA Establishes "Ethics 2000 " to EvaluateLegalEthics (visitedMar. 19,
1999) <http://www.abanet.org/media/jul97/eth200O.html> TheABA'sEthlcs 2000
Commission is a 10-member Special Committee on the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. It was established to examine the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, originally adopted m 1983. See id.
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for the clause "death or substantial bodily harm."N Two alternatives to
"imminent" are the use of "reasonably certain" or "probable."5 Finally, the
modifier may be dropped completely, a solution termed "the Montreal
formulation" by the Commission's Reporter.6
This Comment is limited to a discussion of which modifier, if any, the
Commission should elect for Rule 1.6(b)(1), but there are several additional
issues currently under consideration by the Commission.7 Among these is
whether disclosure should be mandatory or remain permissive.' "As a
purely ethical matter, under Rule 1.6 as promulgated by the ABA, there is
no mandatory disclosure of a client confidence even to prevent a death;
disclosure is merely permissible. Several states, however, weigh the
competing policies differently "9 This issue is closely related to but not
entirely dependent upon the choice of a modifier.
Tins Comment provides a general overview of the use of "immment"
in Rule 1.6(b)(1) and presents the Commission's most recent view of the
use of this modifier as well as the Reporter's suggestion.1" In addition, a
brief look at criticisms of"immment" is provided " along with reference to
4 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Ob-
servations (A)(2) (Proposed Rule Draft No. 5, 1998).
'See id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(b), (c). Note that as of March
23, 1999, the Commission has drafted the rule using "reasonably certain" rather
than "immnment" or this Comment's recommendation of no modifier at all. See
Center for Professional Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.6-Public Discussion
Draft (visited May 26, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/rulel6draft.html>
6 MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations
(A)(2)(d).
'See id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations.
' See, e.g., Professional Responsibility Notes, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1994, at 54,
55. According to the Department of the Army,
[w]hen an army lawyer learns that a client intends serious prospective
criminal conduct Army Rule 1.6(b) requires disclosure of that m-
formation.
Army Rule 1.6 differs from the American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Rule after which it was generally patterned:
Army Rule 1.6 attempts to resolve this dilemma [between prevention of
harm and protection of the client] by removing discretion and
mandating disclosure
Id.
9[Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 55:903 (Mar. 24, 1993).
'oSee infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
"See infra noted 30-42 and accompanying text.
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the treatment of Rule 1.6 by state legislatures.' 2 Finally, a review of the
Montreal formulation is offered along with the author's recommendation
to adopt this formulation.
1 3
The reader should note that this Comment focuses largely on the use
of "immment" versus the use of no modifier at all as seen m the Montreal
formulation. The Ethics 2000 Commission, however, has most recently
decided to use "reasonably certain" as the modifier in Rule 1.6(b)(1).'4
Despite tis decision, the observations and suggestions herein still help
illuminate the debate. They may also help state bar associations consider
the implications of adopting or rejecting the Model Rules' new approach.
Finally, these issues are likely to arise again in the future, bringing renewed
relevance to the content of this Comment.
I. COMMISSION SAYS "KEEP
'IMMINENT' OR 'REASONABLY CERTAIN' "
At its 1998 Montreal meeting, 5 the Commission tentatively approved
a revision to Rule 1.6(b)(1) now known as "the Montreal formulation."'
6
This formulation reads: "(b) 'the lawyer may disclose to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary (1) to prevent death or substantial
bodily harm.'"' 1 The comment to this provision would then state:
"Disclosure is reasonably necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily
harm not only if the injury is imminent, but also if there is a present and
substantial threat that a person will suffer such injury at a later date."' 8
The Reporter prefers the Montreal formulation to the alternative
proposed modifiers orthe existing "imminent" language. 9 According to the
Reporter, the
Comment works quite well as an explanation of the requirement that the
lawyer reasonably believe that disclosure is "necessary" to prevent death
See mnfra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
'3 See mnfra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
See Center for Professional Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.6-Public Dis-
cussion Draft (visited May 26, 1999) <http://www.abanetorg/cpr/e2klrulel6draft.
html>
'" Montreal, Que., May 30-31, 1998.
16 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observa-
tions (A)(2)(d) (Proposed Rule Draft No. 5, 1998).





or substantial bodily harm. This suggests that there may be no need to add
an adjective to modify the Rule's reference to death or substantial bodily
harm. To the extent additional commentary is needed to explain nuances,
such commentary can be tied to the Rule's requirement that the disclosure
be necessary.
20
Subsequently, the Reporter explained:
Given the primacy of life and bodily integrity, the Reporter recommends
the adoption of the formulation approved in Montreal-a terse grant of
permission to a lawyer to reveal client information to the extent the
lawyer "reasonably believes necessary" to prevent death or substantial
bodily harm, with resort to commentary to the extent necessary to convey
the message that the lawyer must be careful not to jump to premature
conclusions, but that the lawyer need not wait until the last possible
moment before taking preventive action.21
The Commission approved replacing the imminence requirement with
the Montreal formulation at the Montreal meeting, but the Commission
revisited Rule 1.6(b)(1) during its later Toronto meeting.' At the Toronto
meeting, the Commission voted to retain the Model Rule requirement of
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.2? The Commission also sought
to add to the rule a comment "indicat[ing] that the 'imminence' require-
ment does not mean that the lawyer has to wait until death is at the
doorstep."24 According to the Reporter's Observations, this defining
comment might read: "Death or substantial bodily harm is inmment not
only if it will be suffered immediately, but also if there [is] a present and
substantial threat that a person will suffer such injury at a later date." As
alternatives to "imminent," modifiers such as "reasonably certain"26 or
20Id.
211 Id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2).
I Toronto, Ont., July 31-Aug. 1, 1998.
23 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Obser-
vations (A)(2).
24 Id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(a).
I Id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(d).
26 The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998), uses "reasonably certain" as the modifier to
"death or serious bodily harm." It reads, "(1) A lawyer may use or disclose
confidential client information when and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably
believes such use or disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
serious bodily harm to a person." Id. Determining what is "reasonably certain"
death or bodily harm may be a difficult task, as indicated in the existing comments
1334 [V'OL. 87
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"probable" could be substituted. The language of the comment would
remain the same, however, with "imminent" simply being replaced by
either "reasonably certain" or "probable." '27
At its meeting in Chicago m September 1998,28 the Commission then
decided to replace "imminent" with "reasonably certain."'29 This permuta-
tion is still in place so that a lawyer may reveal confidential information to
prevent "reasonable certain death or substantial bodily harm."
1I. PROBLEMS WITH "IMMINENT"
There are several concerns surrounding the use of "imminent" i Rule
1.6(b)(1). One major concern arises from the proposed comment. Although
the suggested comment is similar to that used in the Restatement ofthe Law
Governing Lawyers, the Reporter stated that this language "bears no
resemblance to the standard dictionary definition of 'imminent' as 'likely
to occur at any moment."' 30 The Reporter recommends against using tis
language to explain imminence.
Other legal commentators agree. According to Richard A. Zitrn of
Zitrn & Mastromonaco in San Francisco, the imminence requirement
should be changed to "inevitable."3 Zitrn believes that "'imminent'
focuses too much on acts by individuals and that 'inevitable' would better
cover the more likely scenario of a lawyer who learns that a toxic waste
dump will eventually cause illness or death to those on nearby property "32
Commission member Seth Rosner suggested that "inevitable" be added to
"imminent" rather than replacing it.
33
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6: "It is very difficult for a
lawyer to 'know' when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the
client may have a change of mind." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 cmt. (1998).
27 See id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(a)-(c) (Proposed Rule Draft
No. 5, 1998).
Chicago, Ill., Sept. 27-28, 1998.
29 See Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Meeting Minutes
(visited May 13, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/092798mtg.html>
30 MODELRULES OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations
(A)(2)(a) (Proposed Rule Draft No. 5, 1998).
31 See Ethics 2000 Commission Hears Plenty of Suggestions for Reforming
ModelRules, [14 CurrentReports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 262,
262 (June 10, 1998).
32 Id.
33 See id. at 262-63.
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Imminent, inevitable, reasonably certain, probable-what is all the fuss?
According to Professor Roger C. Cramton of Cornell Law School, the
current model rule, which uses "imminent," is a "'scandal to the
profession."' 34 He referred to the rule as "an 'embarrassment' to law
professors who must try to explain and justify it to students."' Further-
more, the current Rule 1.6 is "'just plain wrong.'
3 6
Among Cramton's criticisms of the rule is that it "provides insufficient
protection 'to human life and bodily integrity' through the rule's narrow
exceptions for disclosure." 37 Professor Cramton is not alone. At the first
public hearing of the Comnnission, held at the Montreal meeting, fourteen
speakers presented the Commission with recommendations for changes to
the Model Rules and comments. Among these recommendations was
Professor Cramton's straightforward proposal for Rule 1.6: a lawyer may
reveal confidential information "to prevent death or substantial bodily
harm.' 39 Others suggested that the Commission consider the formulation
used in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers ("Restatement"). 4° According to section 1 17A(l) of the Restate-
ment, "a lawyer may disclose confidential client information. to
prevent reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm to a person."' This
is in fact essentially what the Commission did in Chicago42 and may result
in a workable compromise between "imminent" and the possibility of no
modifier as suggested by Cramton and reflected in the Montreal formula-
tion.
]I. DO WHAT THE STATES WANT
According to commentary m the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct, "Rule 1.6 as it was approved by the ABA House of
Delegates in 1983 proved to be perhaps the least popular measure in the
original Model Rules; very few states adopted the ABA's suggested
341 Id. at 262 (quoting Cramton's written proposal).
3 Id. (quoting Cramton's written proposal).
36 Id. (quoting Crarnton's written proposal).
37 Id. (quoting Cramnton's written proposal).
38 See id. at 264.
391d. This is the same as the formulation adopted at the Commission's Montreal
meeting but later rejected.
0 See id.
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNINGLAWYERS § 117A (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
42 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
1336 [VOL. 87
THE MONTREAL FORMULATION
language."43 As the Lawyers 'Manual indicates, "[o]ne consequence of the
states' rejection of the model rule is a lack of uniformity among the
jurisdictions as to what information lawyers must keep inviolate and what
information may-or must-be revealed." The Lawyers 'Manual also says:
Of the jurisdictions that have adopted ethics rules based to some degree
upon the ABA Model Rules, well over half have amended Rule 1.6 so as
to modify the lawyer's obligations concerning confidentiality.
The major points of difference are whether disclosure should be
required rather than merely permitted, to preventa client from committing
a crime; whether the "crime prevention" exception should extend to all
crimes or only to those likely to result m death or serious bodily harm;
whether the "crime prevention" exception should also extend to frauds;
and whether disclosure should be permitted to rectify the consequences
of a client's crime or fraud.45
At least nineteen states permit or mandate lawyers to disclose
confidential information to prevent a crime.46 For example, Virginia
lawyers "must reveal a client's intention to commit a crime, but they must
first warn the client that they have tlns duty to disclose and urge the client
to abandon his plans."47 Arizona lawyers are permitted to disclose "absent
client consent, a client's intent to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime."" The same is true for lawyers in Minne-
sota,49 Washington,5 0 North and South Carolina, Arkansas," and
Colorado.52
Idaho lawyers are permittedto disclose information "to prevent a client
from committing any crime [as well as] to disclose a client's intention to
commit a crime."53 Maryland's rule permits a lawyer to "reveal otherwise
confidential information if the lawyer believes it necessary to do so to
" Ethics 2000 Commisston Hears Plenty of Suggestions for Reform ng Model
Rules, supra note 31, at 262.
44Id.
45 [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 55:104 (Jan. 27, 1993).
46 See id. at 01:11-01:49 (Jan. 21, 1987-Aug. 20, 1997).
471d. at 01.11.
48Id. at 01.14.
49 See Id. at 01:15.
5 See id. at 01:16.
5' See id. at 01.18-01.19, 01:32-01:33.
52See d. at 01:42.
531 d. at 01:22-01:23.
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prevent a client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that would
result in death, substantial bodily mjury, or substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another."54 Hawaii has an even broader
rule greatly expanding opportunities for disclosure.55
Florida lawyers are required "to disclose confidential information to
prevent a client from committing a crime or to prevent death or substantial
bodily harm."'56 The same is true for Texas and Illinois lawyers.5
"Indiana's confidentiality rule retains the predecessor Model Code
provision permitting disclosure of confidential information to prevent a
client from committing any criminal act." s Mississippi permits lawyers to
disclose "information to prevent a client from committing any crime." 59
54 Id. at 01:20. "In addition, the Maryland rule permits disclosure to allow a
lawyer to rectify the consequences of a criminal or fraudulent act in wlch the
lawyer's services have been used." Id.
55 Hawaii's rule allows for disclosure in many situations including:
(1) prevention of fraud likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) prevention of substantial injury to another's financial interests or
property; (3) rectification of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
furtherance of which the lawyer's services were used; (4) establishment of
a defense to a disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based upon the
client's conduct; (5) prevention of a public official or public agency from
committing a criminal or illegal act that a government lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in harm to the public good; (6) rectification of the
consequence of a public official's or public agency's act that the
government lawyer reasonably believes to have been criminal or illegal and




17 See id. at 01:30-01:31, 01:33-01:35. However,
[i]fa Texas lawyer has information clearly establishing that a client is likely
to commit a criminal or fraudulent act likely to result in substantial injury
to someone's financial or property interests, whistle-blowing is not
mandated. The lawyer's only obligation is to make reasonable efforts either
to dissuade his clients from performing the act or persuade the client to take
corrective action for committed acts.
Id. at 01:31. In Illinois, lawyers are permitted to "reveal client confidences or
secrets when required by law or court order or when they involve a client's intent
to commit a crime other than acts resulting in death or serious bodily harm." Id. at
01.34.
5 1Id. at 01:23.
5 1Id. at 01:24.
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The same is true for Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virgma.6 The Kansas
rule also permits lawyers to disclose "to comply with the requirement of
law or the orders of any tribunal."61
Michigan retains "confidences" and "secrets" from the Model Code
and "permits a lawyer to disclose confidences and secrets to prevent a
client from committing a crime and to-rectify the consequences of a client's
illegal or fraudulent act m the furtherance of which the lawyer's services
were used."62 There is no rule similar to 1.6(b)(1) regarding confidentiality
m California, though California lawyers have a duty "to maintain client
confidences and secrets.'6 3 The District of Columbia also retains this
language.
64
As one commentatorpoints out, "at least thirty-five states have adopted
the Model Rules, [but] only a relative handful of states have adopted the
precise position of the Model Rules regarding confidentiality 65 Of the
states that have adopted Rule 1.6, at least nineteen states do not use a
modifier, such as "imminent," for death or bodily harm.66 When adopting
the Model Rules, the states clearly did not want a modifier. The Montreal
formulation thus reflects the states' treatment of disclosure of death or
bodily harm.
IV THE MONTREAL FORMULATION
According to Black's Law Dictionary, "confidential" is defined as
"[i]ntrusted with the confidence of another or with his secret affairs or
I See id. at 01:27-01:29.61 d. at 01:28.
62 Id. at 01:29.
63 Id. at 01:30.
6 The District of Columbia
allows a lawyer to reveal client confidences and secrets when reasonably
necessary to prevent bribery or intimidation of witnesses, jurors, court
officials, or others involved in a legal proceeding. Another provision,
designed specifically for the D.C. Bar's large government-lawyer
membership, defines such lawyers' client as the employing agency and
permits such lawyers to reveal confidences when authorized by law. The
district also adds a new provision requiring lawyers to exercise reasonable
care to prevent employees, associates, and others whose services are used
by lawyers from revealing client confidences.
Id. at 01:36.
65 Lewis Becker, Ethical Concerns m Negotiating Family Law Agreements, 30
FAM. L.Q. 587, 605 (1996).
66 See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
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purposes; intended to be held in confidence or kept secret; done m
confidence."67 Disclosure, as governed by Rule 1.6, involves a delicate
balancing of client confidentiality with the duties of the attorney as a
member of society The comment to the current Rule 1.6 states, "A
fundamental principle m the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer
maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The
client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the
lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter."68
However, the comment also succinctly says that "[t]he lawyer is part of a
judicial system charged with upholding the law ", 69 Lawyers are not just
muted figureheads, nodding in approval or disapproval to what a client
confides. There are limits to this bargamed-for silence.
The Montreal formulation, as discussed above, proposes to disregard
the use of "imminent" to modify the phrase "death or substantial bodily
harm."70 The Montreal formulation would state that a "lawyer may disclose
[confidential information] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily harm."'71
Tins formulation would address the concerns of some commentators.
Former ABA President N. Lee Cooper observed that "professionalism has
not always depended on external regulation and rules. More introspection
and a broader sense of ethics and professionalism must be encouraged to
maintain the bar's system of internal regulation and stem the potential for
'creeping outside regulation' of the legal profession."72 Furthermore,
according to Heidi Li Feldman, a University of Michigan Law School
professor, "the Model Rules' black-letter listing of prohibitions and
permissions encourages lawyers to use the ethics code as an aid to create
defensible legal arguments for the desired position or result. ''r3 Feldman
condemned this as "'technocratic lawyerng,"' and would like to see a
67 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (6th ed. 1990).
68 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 crnt. (1998).
69 Id.
0See id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(d) (Proposed Rule DraftNo.
5, 1998).
71 Id.
72 ABA Speakers Debate Proposals for Reshaping Ethics Rules, [13 Current
Reports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 158 (June 11, 1997). See Gila
M. Tuoni, Society Versus the Lawyers: The Strange Hierarchy ofProtections ofthe
'New' Client Confidentiality, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 439 (1993), for a
detailed history of client confidentiality and the legal profession.




return to "aspirational standards and ethical considerations such as [those
contained in] the Model Code."'74 Came Menkel-Meadow, a Georgetown
Umversity Law Center professor, argued that "the Model Code, the Model
Rules, and the forthcoming Restatement focus too much on a lawyer's role
as a representative of the client and too little on a lawyer's alternative roles,
such as problem solver, peace maker, and social worker."75 Finally, Monroe
Freedman, professor of legal ethics at Hofstra Umversity Law School, has
observed that Rule 1.6 precludes a lawyer from disclosing information "to
prevent injury or death that is not imminent. ' 76 He concluded that lawyers
should be permitted to divulge this information and proposed to the
American Law Institute an amendment to the Restatement's section 117A
to delete the immnent requirement.'
By deleting the "imminent" requirement, the Commission would
broaden the disclosure rule, thereby giving lawyers more discretion. As
previously noted, many states modified Rule 1.6 in their adoption of the
rule. At least nineteen states opted for a broader rule-one that permits
lawyers to disclose confidential information to prevent a crime, not just
"imminent" ones.7 Thus the current Model Rule 1.6 is ineffective as a
"model." A more effective "model" rulewouldbe one that is broad and can
then be limited as necessary The Montreal formulation permits disclosure
to prevent death or substantial bodily harm.79 This should be the "model"
rule-the recommendation of the ABA. A state could then work from this
basic rule, adapting the rule to read "imminent," "reasonably certain,"
"probable," "likely," or otherwise as it finds necessary.
Affording lawyers this broad discretion does not mean that the role of
the lawyer will cross into that of policing. Lawyers should be able to give
effective legal counsel while retaining their place in society as persons




See id. The American Law Institute approved his changes. See id.
78 See [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 55:104 (Jan. 27,
1993).
79 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Obser-
vations (A)(2)(d) (Proposed Rule Draft No. 5 1998).
" See Marianne M. Jennings, Forum, The Model Rules and the Code ofPro-
fessional Responsibility Have Absolutely Nothing To Do with Ethics: The Wally
Cleaver Proposition as an Alternative, 1996 WIs. L. REV 1223, for a humorous
and articulate discussion of simplifying the Model Rules. Jennings states, "I believe
we have graduated from craft ethics to crafty ethics. Somehow I envisioned the
1998-99] 1341
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nence requirement, thereby restricting a lawyer's discretion to disclose,
will lawyers retain a sense of civil and ethical duty to society to protect its
members?81 If a lawyer does reveal confidential information for the better
of society, at what cost to the lawyer? If she doesn't, what is the cost?
This is not to say that lawyers will have unbridled discretion should the
Commission adopt the Montreal formulation. Lawyers will still be limited
to disclosure they reasonably believe is necessary 82 As the Reporter stated,
"[W]e should, if at all possible, restrict our use of 'reasonable' or
'reasonably' to situations in which we want to require the lawyer to act as
would a prudent and competent lawyer. '83 While lawyers may be able to
assign limits to what a reasonable belief is, lawyers are often facedwith the
decision to disclose and face malpractice liability or not disclose and fail
to prevent a crime. Commentary in the ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on
Professional Conduct states:
While m theory a lawyer may find himself or herself in trouble for
violating a client's confidence, the reported decisions suggest that in
practice, it is the lawyer who treats the principle of confidentiality as
absolute who is more likely to wind up answering for the consequences.
practice of law as something a bit more noble than seeing how much I could get
away with. Can we move to a higher standard than how much can we get away
with?" Id. at 1227
" See Maura Strassberg, Talang Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Junspru-
dence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV 901 (1995), for a good discussion of
morality and legality.
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A cmt.
g (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) ("Subsequent re-examination of the
reasonableness of a lawyer's action m the light of later developments would be
unwarranted; reasonableness of the lawyer's belief at the time and under the
circumstances in which the lawyer acts is alone controlling."). At the same time,
comment [18] to the Commission's fifth proposed draft of Rule 1.6
is new and attempts to specify some of the steps a lawyer may have to take
before he or she can reasonably believe that disclosure is necessary to
accomplish one of the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1)-(5). Thls
Comment takes the place of sentences that have been deleted from the
Model Rule counterparts to proposed Comments [16][17] and [19].
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observa-
tions (B) cmt. [18]; see also id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (B) cmt. [13],
[14].
83Id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(b) (discussing "reasonable" and
"reasonably" in the context of the "reasonably certain" alternative discussion).
1342 [VOL. 87/
THE MONTREAL FORMULATION
Depending upon the context and the specifics, lawyers face anything
from vacatur of orders entered by the court before which the lawyer's
silence amounted to a misrepresentation, to discipline, to contempt, to
damage liability for fraud, including primary or secondary liability for
securities fraud, to accessory criminal liability, to criminal misconduct
charges.84
When faced with the choice of breaching client confidentiality or
facing criminal liability, what is a lawyer to do? As Comment g to section
117A of the Restatement states, "Critical facts may be unclear, emotions
may be high, and little time may be available in which the lawyer must
decide on an appropriate course of action." 5 One interesting issue that
arises is a lawyer's duty to disclose to prevent death or bodily harm when
a client expresses intent to commit suicide.86 According to a Utah ethics
opinion, "[i]f it is in the best interests of a client, an attorney who
reasonably believes the client is contemplating imminent suicide may
disclose a suicide threat to another who may help prevent it.""7 Of what
significance is it to limit disclosure of threat of suicide to "imminent"
suicide? If intent to commit suicide should be disclosed because the lawyer
may be the only one who knows of it, why must the suicide be "immi-
nent" 9 Would not the policy behind such permitted disclosure be better
served if the threatened suicidal act were far enough in the future that
medical treatment could be sought?
Legal scholar George W Overton has commented as follows on an
additional issue in the suicide scenario:
[Illinois] Rule 1.6(b) says "A lawyer shall reveal information about a
client to prevent the client from committing an act that would result
in death. "The drafters of the Illinois Rules presumably never thought
about whose death would be involved and assumed it would be someone
else's death. If the lawyer should reveal the commuication (e.g., to the
client's spouse), will the lawyer have a defense against the client's charge
4 [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 55:110 (Jan. 27, 1993).
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS § 117A cmt g.
86 See generally Kimberly A. Gough, Note, The Conflict Between Confiden-
tiality and Disclosure When a Client Announces Suicidal Intentions: A Proposed
Amendment to the Model Ethics Codes, 40 WAYNE L. REv 1629 (1994)
(exammmg a lawyer's dilemma of whether to disclose or not disclose that his or
her client is contemplating suicide).8' Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinon Comm., Op. 95 (1989).
1998-991 1343
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of a disciplinary violation? Threats of suicide, talk of it, etc., may often
reflect transitory emotional crises. In other words, there may be a living
a client who can complain about disclosure.
88
Overton concludes, "ABA Model Rule 1.6 differs substantially, and
permits lawyer disclosure only to prevent criminal acts ofthe client 'likely
to result in imminent death:' one's own suicide is not one's own crime."
89
If the Montreal formulation-disclosure permitted to prevent death or
substantial bodily harm-is adopted, will this extend to cases of physician-
assisted suicide?9° In such cases, the client might tell his lawyer that he
desires to end his suffering through physician-assisted suicide. In some
cases, the lawyer should probably disclose the intent to commit suicide.
Special issues arise when the suicide is physician-assisted in that the
suicide may not be "imminment" under the current rule.91 If the Commission
adopts the Montreal formulation, however, the timing of the suicide is not
an issue. The policy of getting the client sufficient medical treatment and
preventing death can be served.
Other troubling issues arise when the client's conduct is illegal, as in
the case of child abuse, but the lawyer does not have an obligation to
disclose under ethics rules.92 For example, a North Carolina ethics opinon
8 George W Overton, The Suicidal Client, CBA REC., Sept. 1994, at 46.
89 Id.
90See generally Yale Kamisar, Physician Assisted Suicide: The Problems Pre-
sented by the Compelling, Heartwrenching Case, 88 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1121 (1998).
91 One illustration of this is the broadcasting of a man's suicide, assisted by Dr.
Jack Kevorklan, on the CBS newsmagazine show, 60 Minutes. See "60 Minutes "
Follows Up Suicide Show, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 1, 1999), available in 1999
WL 12934485. Given the planning and media coordination involved to air this
suicide, was it "immment"?
What if physician-assisted suicide is not illegal? On what basis should the
lawyer disclose? Currently, 36 states have enacted laws banning assisted suicide.
One state, Oregon, has legalized the practice for terminally ill patients. See Daniel
LeDuc, Maryland Senate Votes to Ban Assisted Suicide, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
1999, at B2. The issue of disclosure in such a situation remains unresolved.
92 Many states have enacted mandatory legal disclosure statutes apart from
ethics rules requiring disclosure to the police or social services suspicions of child
abuse. For example, Kentucky law provides:
Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is
dependent, neglected, or abused shall immediately cause an oral or written
report to be made to a local law enforcement agency or the Kentucky state
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held "that a lawyer who learns that his clients' minor children are victims
of continuing abuse is not required by ethics rules to report the abuse,
although failing to report may subject the lawyer to cinmmal prosecution
under a state reporting statute."93 In Massachusetts,
a lawyer who had represented a camp counselor m a case involving
indecent assault upon young children learned the former client had
completed probation and was working at a children's camp. The
committee ruled that if the lawyer believed that the client was reasonably
likely to commit a further offense, and if the lawyer could not persuade
the former client to make the disclosure himself, then the lawyer was free
to discuss the matter with the camp or the authorities.
94
Another approach is that taken by Kentucky, which "adds an exception [to
the confidentiality rule] that gives a lawyer the discretion to reveal
information necessary to comply with other laws or court orders."95
In his observations, the Commission's Reporter highlights concerns
regarding disclosure of child sexual abuse as well as certain diseases.
Specifically, the Reporter presents two questions for the Commission's
review- "Should substantial bodily harm be explained as including 'the
police; the cabinet or its designated representative; the commonwealth's
attorney or the county attorney; by telephone or otherwise. Nothing in
this section shall relieve individuals for their obligations to report.
KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 620.030(1) (Miclue 1990). For a good overview of the
problem of child abuse and the balancing of child abuse reporting laws with
attorney-client confidences, see Robert P. Mosteller, ChildAbuse ReportingLaws
and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as
Informant, 42 DuKE L.J. 203 (1992). See generally Robin A. Rosencrantz, Note,
Rejecting "Hear No Evil Speak No Evil" Expanding the Attorney's Role In Child
Abuse Reporting, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 327 (1995).
See also Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-12 (1998)
(opining that a lawyer does not violate ethical rules if the lawyer does not report
child abuse, although required by law, when the lawyer learned of abuse from a
client who refuses to consent to disclosure); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 94-111 (1994) (stating that the
lawyer probably does not have an obligation to reveal knowledge of child abuse).
93 [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 55:904 (Mar. 24,1993)
(citing North Carolina Bar Ass'n, Op. 120 (1992)).
" Id. at 55:905 (citing Massachusetts Ethics Op. 1990-2 (1990)).
95 [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:31 (Mar. 28, 1990);
see KY. SUP Cr. R. 3.130-1.6(b)(3).
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consequences of child sexual abuse' ,p6 "Should substantial bodily harm
be explained as including 'life threatening and debilitating illness, such as
cancer and AIDS9"' 97
If "substantial bodily harm" is expanded to include child abuse and
certain diseases, how does the choice of modifier affect what may or must
be disclosed to prevent such harm? "Imminent" as defined by Black's Law
Dictionary means "[n]ear at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close
rather than touching; impending; on the point of happening; threatening;
menacing; perilous "98 In contrast, the Reporter suggests that the
proposed comment, which would define "imminent" as used m Rule 1.6,11
"is consistent with Comment d to § 117A of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers that serves as an explanation of the Restatement's
requirement that the death or bodily harm be 'reasonably certain. 'm °
Furthermore, the Reporter asserts that "[t]he problem with this comment
language is that it bears no resemblance to the standard dictionary
definition of 'imminent' as 'likely to occur at any moment."' 101 Based on
Black's Legal Dictionary, if the imminence requirement is retained, a
lawyer would have to determine whether the abuse or disease is "impend-
ing" or "threatening." Ths may be difficult to ascertain-when future abuse
is likely to occur or when diseases, such as cancer or AIDS, will be
manifested. If the Montreal formulation is adopted, this problem is
eliminated. Lawyers will be afforded greater discretion regarding disclo-
sure. Thus, if a lawyer knows that his client has abused a child m the past,
the lawyer may use his discretion to disclose information under the ethical
96 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observa-
tions (B) cmt. [13] (Proposed Rule Draft No. 5, 1998). The Reporter noted that
"[c]omment c to section 117A of The Restatement includes 'the consequences of
events such as child sexual abuse' within the meaning of 'serious bodily
harm.' "Id. Note that the Reporter "drafted [Comment [13]] on the assumption that
the Rule will permit disclosure to prevent 'probable' death or substantial bodily
harm." Id.97 Id. The Reporter noted that "[c]omment c to § 117A of The Restatement m-
eludes 'life-threatenmg illness' within the meaning of 'serious bodily harm.' "Id.
For a discussion of current legal issues concerning AIDS, see Rhonda R. Rivera,
Lawyers, Client, and AIDS: Some Notes.from the Trenches, 49 OHIO ST. L.L 883
(1989).
9 8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990).
99 See supra text accompanying note 25.





rules to prevent future abuse regardless of Ins belief of when such future
abuse may occur. The same holds true for infectious or fatal diseases.
CONCLUSION
The Montreal formulation sunply makes sense. To the extent that
lawyers are a self-governing body, any "model" rule proposed by
representatives of that body should reflect what its constituents want and
what they are likely to approve: The former Rule 1.6, using "imminent,"
has proved to be unworkable through alterations by most states. If the
Commission had adopted the Montreal formulation for Rule 1.6, it would
have achieved a new, more workable approach without completely
abandoning the old. By adopting the Montreal formulation, the Commis-
sion also would have drafted a "model" rule consistent with the interpreta-
tion of at least nineteen states.
The Reporter suggested that the comment to the Montreal formulation
read: "Disclosure is reasonably necessary to prevent death or substantial
bodily harm not only if the injury is imminent, but also ifthere is a present
and substantial threat that a person will suffer such injury at a later date.""°2
With this comment, the Commission would have retained the concept of
imminence in guiding lawyer's discretion under the Montreal formulation.
Despite its apparent rejection, the Montreal formulation is the best revision
for Rule 1.6 because it offers a sunple, clear guide for lawyers in using
their discretion to disclose or not disclose confidential information in the
wide array of real-life situations lawyers face.
102 Id. Rule 1.6 Reporter's Observations (A)(2)(d).
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